Abstract In this paper, using the LLL reduction method and computing the integral points of two classes of conics, we develop attacks on DSA and ECDSA in case where the secret and the ephemeral key of a signed message or theirs modular inverses are sufficiently small and in case where the ephemeral keys or theirs modular inverses of two signed messages are sufficiently small.
160 with q| p −1 and g is a generator of the unique order q subgroup G of Z * p . Further, he chooses a ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} and computes A = g a mod p. The public key of the signer is ( p, q, g, A) and his private key a. Furthermore, the signer chooses a publicly known hash function h mapping messages to {0, . . . , q − 1}. To sign a message m, he chooses a random number k ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} which is the ephemeral key, computes r = (g k mod p) mod q and s = k −1 (h(m) + ar) mod q.
The signature of m is the pair (r, s). The verification of the signature is performed by checking
The ECDSA uses an elliptic curve E over F p and a point P ∈ E(F p ) with order a prime q of size around 160 bits. The signer selects a ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} and computes Q = a P. Its public key is ( p, E, P, q, Q) and his private key a. To sign a message m having hash value h(m) ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, he selects a random number k ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} which is the ephemeral key and computes k P = (x, y) (where x and y are regarded as integers between 0 and p − 1). Next, he computes r = x mod q and s = k He accepts the signature if and only if r = x 0 mod q. The assumption here is that the only way to forge signature is to recover either the secret key a, or the ephemeral key k (in this case is a simple matter to compute a). Thus, the parameters of the two systems were chosen in such a way that the computation of discrete logarithms is computationally infeasible, and so a and k are well protected.
The use of lattices and the so-called LLL reduction method [13] is a well established tool for attacking a variety of cryptosystems. Attacks to DSA and to ECDSA using lattice reduction techniques are given in [1, 10, 16, 17] and [3] . A common feature of these attacks is that take advantage of the form of equality s = k −1 (h(m)+ar) mod q. In [1] it was shown that one can recover the DSA secret key a, if the ephemeral key k is produced by Knuth's linear congruential generator with known parameters, or variants. In [10] , an attack on DSA is described in case where for some number of different signatures a proportion of bits of each of the associated ephemeral keys are revealed. A polynomial-time attack on DSA which recover a is described in [16] , in case where the size of q is not too small compared with p, the probability of collisions for the hash function is not too large compared to 1/q and for a polynomially bounded number of messages, about log 1/2 2 (q) of the least significant bits of the ephemeral keys are known. The previous attack is adapted to the case of ECDSA [17] . Finally, in [3] , under the assumption that the second shortest vector of the reduced lattice is sufficiently short, it is determined how large the keys a and k can be in order for them to be computed by considering only one signature.
In this paper, using the algorithm LLL and two algorithms for the computation of the integral points of two classes of conics, we present some new rigorous attacks on DSA and ECDSA which are based on the equality s = k −1 (h(m) + ar) mod q. Assuming that a signature is available and the numbers in at least one of the sets {a, k −1 mod q}, {k, a −1 mod q} and {a −1 mod q, k −1 mod q} are sufficiently small, we prove that the secret keys a and k can be revealed. Similarly, if two signatures with ephemeral keys k 1 and k 2 are available and the numbers in at least one of the sets
2 mod q} are sufficiently small, then k 1 , k 2 and so a can be computed.
In [18] , we presented a version of the DSA which combines the intractability of the integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm problem, and it is at least as secure as DSA. It uses computations in the group Z * n , where n is the product of two large primes which is part of the private key, and so the order of the underlying group is hidden. An immediate consequence of this fact is that the above mentioned attacks and the attacks described in this paper do not longer work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, some results on the LLL reduction method are recalled and two methods for the solution of Diophantine equations bx + cy + dx y = 0 and b + cy + dx y = 0 are given which are necessary for our attacks. Our attacks using one signed message are presented in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we deal with the attacks using two signed messages. In Sect. 5 an example which illustrates our method is presented. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
Auxiliary results
In this section we give some results which will be useful for the development of our attacks.
n is defined to be the quantity
The LLL algorithm [13] acts on a matrix with rows the vectors of a basis of L and produces a basis having a quite short vector. We shall need the following result: 
Furthermore, we shall use the following well known lemma whose proof is given in [9] . 
Lemma 2 (Howgrave-Graham
β 1 1 , . . . , p β k k (0 ≤ β i ≤ b i , i = 1, . . . , k) of b requires O((log β) 2 ) bit
Remark 2 The above algorithm implies that the number of integer solutions of the equation g(x, y) = 0 is O(M ).
3 Attacks using one signed message Let x, x ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} be such that x = q − x . We set x = x if x ≤ x and x = −x , otherwise. Further, we write simply x −1 instead of x −1 mod q.
In this section we describe our attacks using one signed message. Let m be a message and (r, s) its signature with DSA (resp. ECDSA). Then there is k ∈ {1, . . . , q −1} such that r = (g k mod p) mod q (resp. k P = (x, y)) and s = k −1 (h(m) + ar) mod q.
(1) Suppose there are positive integers X and Y such that |a| < X, |k −1 | < Y and XY 2 < q/6 3/2 .
ATTACK1

Input: (h(m), r, s).
Output: a. 
is the element of the set S of
(2) Suppose there are positive integers X and Y such that |k| < X, |a −1 | < Y and XY 2 < q/6 3/2 . The following algorithm provides us with the secret key a.
ATTACK2
Input: (h(m), r, s).
ATTACK3
Input: (h(m), r, s).
Put H (x, y) = η 0 x + η 1 y + η 2 x y. As in the first case we have η 2 = 0 and
Time complexity of the attacks.
We deal with the three attacks simultaneously.
Step 1 needs O((log q) 2 ) bit operations. By Lemma 1, the application of LLL algorithm in Step 2 requires O((log q) 3 ) bit operations.
Step 3 requires O((log q) 2 ) bit operations. Since the coefficients of polynomials (x, y), (x, y) and H (x, y) are no negative integers < q, Step 4 needs O(q ) bit operations, where > 0 is arbitrarily small, provided the factorization of γ 0 in the first attack, δ 0 in the second attack, and of η 0 , η 1 in the third attack are known.
In practice q is a prime of size 160 and so, the integers γ 0 , δ 0 , η 0 and η 1 have less than 50 decimal digits. As it is pointed out in [4] it is now routine to factor a 100-decimal digits integer and so, the factorization of the above numbers is quite easy with the current algorithms. Furthermore, note that the numbers γ 0 , δ 0 , η 0 and η 1 are random and are not constructed in a such way that their factorization is difficult.
We remark also that in case where γ 0 , (respectively δ 0 , and η 0 , η 1 ) has many divisors, the set S is large but on the other hand γ 0 (respectively δ 0 , and η 0 , η 1 ) can be easily factored. 
Remark 3
If a and k satisfy |a −1 | ≥ q 1/2 and |k −1 | ≥ q 1/2 , then we see that the above attacks do not work. A such case is the example given in [15] .
Remark 4
Suppose that in ATTACK1 we have XY ≤ ||v|| 2/3 . Then Coppersmith's method [5, Corollary 2] computes all the integer pairs (x, y) with (x, y) = 0, |x 0 | ≤ X , and |y| ≤ Y in time polynomial in log ||v||. Since ATTACK1 uses only the above solutions, we can replace the use of the algorithm SOLVE-CONIC2 in Step 4 by Coppersmith's method. As we have ||v|| < q the time complexity of Step 4 is polynomial in log q. The same holds for ATTACK2 and ATTACK3.
Attacks using two signed messages
Let (r 1 , s 1 ) and (r 2 , s 2 ) be the DSA or ECDSA signatures of two messages m 1 and m 2 with ephemeral keys k 1 and k 2 , respectively. Then we have
Eliminating a from the two equalities we obtain the congruence
Hence the couples (k 1 
2 ) are solutions of the congruences
Thus, in case we have two signed messages as above and there are positive integers X and Y satisfying one of the following:
1 | < Y and XY < q 1/2 /6 3/4 , we can develop similar attacks to the attacks 1, 2, 3 of Sect. 3, respectively. Since the algorithms of the attacks and the complexity issues are essentially the same as in the aforementioned attacks we omit their description.
We denote by γ 0 + γ 1 y + γ 2 x y, δ 0 + δ 1 y + δ 2 x y and η 0 x + η 1 y + η 2 x y the polynomials constructed using the LLL-algorithm, as in the previous section, for the cases (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Then we have the following theorem: 
An Example
We consider the elliptic curve given in [2, Example 3, p. 182]. We have the prime p = 2 160 + 7 = 1461501637330902918203684832716283019655932542983 and the elliptic curve E defined over F p by the equation
The number of points of E(F p ) is
which is a prime number. We consider the following point of E(F p ):
We take as private key a = 2 50 + 15 = 1125899906842639 and so, the public key is Q = a P = (q 1 , q 2 ), where
Let m be a message with hash value h(m) = 1073765281. We sign m using as ephemeral key k = 439720460832567442691308144771133691068835481301.
We have k P = (k 1 , k 2 ), where
Since k 1 < q, we put r = k 1 . Next we compute
and finally
Thus, the signature of the message m is (r, s). Taking X = 2 58 and Y = 2 50 we can compute a using the algorithm of ATTACK1. We first compute
and
Let L be the lattice generated by (q, 0, 0), (0, qY, 0) and (b, cY, XY ). Using the LLL algorithm, we obtain the element (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ) ∈ L, where
We put γ 0 = C 0 and we compute
and γ 2 = C 2 / XY = 558038895261061.
We consider the conic (x, y) = γ 0 + γ 1 y + γ 2 x y. The number C 0 has 6144 positive divisors. We deduce that the only integer solution of (x, y) = 0 is (x, y)=(1125899906842639, 34359738491) and as we see the x-coordinate of this solution is the secret key a.
Conclusion
In this paper, combining lattice reduction techniques with algorithms for computing the integral solutions of the equations bx + cy + dx y = 0 and b + cy + dx y = 0, we develop some rigorous attacks on DSA and ECDSA. If one signature is available having secret key a and ephemeral key k and the numbers in at least one of the sets {a, k −1 }, {k, a −1 }, {a −1 , k −1 } satisfy a certain inequality, then a can be computed in practice. The same happens, if two signatures are available with ephemeral keys k 1 , k 2 and the numbers in at least one of the sets {k 1 , k The above attacks can also be applied on other schemes where the secret and the ephemeral keys are solutions of a modular bivariate linear equation as in DSA or of a modular bivariate equation of second degree. For instance, such schemes are Schnorr' signature, Heyst-Pedersen signature, etc [14, 19] .
Our attacks on DSA require O(q (log p) 3 ) bit operations and on ECDSA need O(q ) bit operations and O(q ) elliptic curve group operations. Furthermore, these two attacks need the factorization of one or two integers < q. Note that these numbers are random and not chosen in such a way that their factorization is difficult. In practice the size of q is 160 and so, the factorization of the above numbers is quite easy with the current algorithms. Therefore, our attacks can be quite efficient.
